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Although a high level of drop-out from community-based health insurance (CBHI) is frequently 
reported, it has rarely been analysed in depth. This study explores whether never having actively 
participated in CBHI is a determinant of drop-out. A conceptual framework of passive and active 
community participation in CBHI is developed to inform quantitative data analysis. Fieldwork 
comprising a household survey was conducted in Senegal in 2009. Levels of active participation 
among 382 members and ex-members of CBHI across three case study schemes are compared using 
logistic regression. Results suggest that, controlling for a range of socioeconomic variables, the more 
active the mode of participation in the CBHI scheme, the stronger the statistically significant positive 
correlation with remaining enrolled.  Training is the most highly correlated, followed by voting, 
participating in a general assembly, awareness raising / information dissemination and informal 
discussions / spontaneously helping. Possible intermediary outcomes of active participation such as 
perceived trustworthiness of the scheme management / president; accountability and being 
informed of mechanisms of controlling abuse/fraud are also significantly positively correlated with 
remaining in the scheme. Perception of poor quality of health services is identified as the most 
important determinant of drop-out. Financial factors do not seem to determine drop-out. The 
results suggest that schemes may be able to reduce drop-out and increase quality of care by creating 
more opportunities for more active participation. Caution is needed though, since if CBHI schemes 
uncritically fund and promote participation activities, individuals who are already more empowered 
or who already have higher levels of social capital may be more likely to access these resources, 
thereby indirectly further increasing social inequalities in health coverage.  
Keywords:   
Senegal, community-based health insurance, participation, insurance coverage, drop-out, cross-
sectional survey 
 1. Introduction 
Community-based health insurance (CBHI) aims to provide financial protection from the cost of 
seeking health care through voluntary prepayment by community members; typically it is not-for-
profit and community owned and controlled (Atim, 1998; Hsiao, 2001). The Senegalese government 
elected in 2012 views CBHI as a key mechanism for achieving universal coverage (Ministère de la 
Santé, 2012), a policy initiated by the previous government (Ministère de la Santé, 2004). Senegal 
has witnessed a rapid increase in the number of CBHI schemes, reaching around 139 between 1997 
and 2004 (Hygea 2004). Yet as in most low- and middle-income countries (LMIC), overall population 
coverage remains low, with 4% or less of the Senegalese population enrolled in CBHI (Soors et al., 
2010). Another problem for CBHI schemes is retaining enrolees; it is estimated that in Senegal in 
2004, 47% of people who had ever enrolled in CBHI had ceased paying the premium and therefore 
lost access to the benefits of CBHI (Hygea, 2004). In order to explore why people drop-out of CBHI 
schemes, this paper develops a conceptual framework of community participation in CBHI and draws 
on data collected in a household survey on the relationship between CBHI membership, active 




Drop-out from CBHI 
While drop-out from CBHI is frequently reported as a problem it has rarely been analysed in depth 
(De Allegri et al., 2009). Two exceptions come from West Africa. One is a quantitative study of a CBHI 
scheme in Burkina Faso which had been operational for three years and had a drop-out rate of 30.9 
to 45.7% (Dong et al., 2009). The study focuses entirely on demographic, economic and health-
related indicators and finds that female household head, increased age, lower education, fewer 
illness episodes, fewer children or elderly in a household, poor health care quality, less seeking care, 
higher household expenditure and shorter distance to the contracted health facility were correlated 
with increased drop-out. The other paper is a qualitative study from Guinea-Conakry (Criel & 
Waelkens, 2003) where CBHI population coverage fell from 8% of the target population to about 6% 
in the following year. The main reasons for non-enrolment and drop-out were poor quality of care 
and reported inability to pay the premium.  
Understanding of the concept of insurance, information flow, mistrust of institutionalised associative 
movements, confidence in the management of CBHI and integration of CBHI with existing systems of 
mutual aid were found not to be underlying causes, possibly because CBHI promoters discussed the 
scheme with community members from the start (Criel & Waelkens, 2003). However, as with the 
Burkina Faso study, the Guinea-Conakry study was conducted only two years after the 
commencement of the scheme. This makes it difficult to assess the longer-term determinants of 
drop-out and the sustainability of the participatory dynamic of the scheme.  
 
Community participation in CBHI 
Community participation, ownership and control in scheme design and management are in principle 
key defining features of CBHI (Atim, 1998; Hsiao, 2001; Soors et al., 2010). Smallness of CBHI 
schemes has been seen as a drawback in terms of risk pooling, but an advantage in terms of 
community focus (Davies & Carrin, 2001). As CBHI was rolled out in LMIC, policymakers and 
researchers hoped that the community-oriented approach would promote a set of important 
benefits: trust in CBHI management, solidarity and acceptance of cross-subsidisation, the flow of 
information, the quality of health services; and reduced fraud, moral hazard and adverse selection 
(Davies & Carrin, 2001; Hsiao, 2001; Pauly, 2004; Pauly et al., 2006; Zweifel, 2004). Implicit in this 
view was the idea that CBHI would benefit from existing social capital (Mladovsky & Mossialos, 
2008), defined as “the information, trust and norms of reciprocity inhering in one’s social network” 
(Woolcock, 1998, p. 153). It was hypothesised that the community-oriented dynamic would in turn 
promote high levels of enrolment in CBHI. However, this hypothesis has hardly been studied and the 
various possible modes of community participation in CBHI have never been rigorously 
conceptualised in the form of an overarching theoretical framework.   
 
In contrast, community participation has been extensively conceptualised and analysed in the 
broader literature on health (Morgan, 2001; Rifkin, 1986, 2009; Zakus & Lysack, 1998). Rifkin (1986), 
points to three main approaches to community participation in health programmes: medical; health 
services; and community development. The latter approach defines participation as “community 
members being actively involved in decisions about how to improve [health]”, where health is seen 
as a “human condition which is a result of social, economic and political development” (Rifkin, 1986, 
p. 241). Key factors are “people's perceptions of health and their motivation to change health care” 
as well as the importance of communities “learning how to decide the ways in which change can 
best be achieved” (Rifkin, 1986, p. 241). This approach seems to best match the goals of CBHI as 
described by policymakers and researchers and is the definition adopted in this study. Rifkin further 
distinguishes between different modes of community participation. The most passive mode is 
participating in benefits of the programme: in CBHI this accords with becoming a member of the 
scheme by paying the premium. More active modes in ascending order of range and depth of 
participation are: activities, management, monitoring and evaluating, and planning (Table 1) (Rifkin, 
1986).  
 
It is not clear whether low CBHI enrolment in sub-Saharan Africa could be linked to a lack of active 
participation, as there is little evidence on this topic. The few studies on community participation in 
CBHI present contradictory results. Two qualitative studies (De Allegri et al., 2006; Ridde et al., 2010) 
compare the views of members of CBHI to non-members and find that although levels of active 
community participation in CBHI were generally low, people did not point to this as a reason for not 
enrolling. In contrast, two other qualitative studies (Atim, 1999; Basaza et al., 2007) compare 
schemes in which the level of active community participation was high with schemes with low active 
participation and suggest that higher active participation may be one of the factors accounting for 
higher levels of enrolment. A further qualitative study (Schneider, 2005) suggests that active 
participation may have positively influenced enrolment by building trust, transparency, solidarity 
and honesty.  
 
Objectives of the study 
This study brings together the two aforementioned under-explored themes in CBHI: drop-out and 
active community participation. It is hypothesised that active participation in CBHI and its potential 
intermediary benefits, such as trust, information and solidarity are negatively correlated with drop-
out. This hypothesis is explored by comparing levels of active participation among members and ex-
members of three CBHI schemes in Senegal. 
 
To provide a conceptual framework to guide the analysis, examples of active community 
participation in CBHI identified in the literature on sub-Saharan Africa (Atim, 1999; Basaza et al., 
2007; Criel et al., 2005; Criel & Waelkens, 2003; De Allegri et al., 2006; Ridde et al., 2010; Schneider, 
2005; Waelkens & Criel, 2007) are categorised according to Rifkin’s (1986) framework (Table 1).  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE 
 
3. Methods 
Case study selection 
Fieldwork was conducted in Senegal from March to August 2009. Case study selection criteria were 
the following: 
  
(a) The CBHI schemes had enrolled a greater than average number of households (the average was 
329 (Hygea, 2004)). Enrolment in Senegal is typically on a household basis. A representative of the 
household enrols in the CBHI scheme ("adhérent" in French) and purchases a membership card on 
which a certain number (typically up to 12) household members may be registered. The premium is 
paid monthly (per household member). In this paper, "households" refers to the number of 
membership cards purchased. 
(b) The schemes had been established for a minimum of eight years.  
(c) The schemes had a relatively high drop-out rate compared to the national average (47% in 2004 
(Hygea, 2004)). The rationale for selecting schemes with high drop-out was to focus on contexts 
where there was potentially the most to gain from a policy intervention.  
(d) The CBHI schemes had achieved a basic measure of success (criteria (a) and (b)); this was in order 
to control for the possibility that drop-out was mainly due to fundamental supply-side failures 
ending in the suspension of the scheme. 
 
In order to obtain a range of contextual factors, additional considerations were: region and 
geographic zone; economic sector of the target population; and the type of contracted health facility 
(primary care or hospital).  
 
On basis of local documentation and information provided by Senegalese CBHI experts, three CBHI 
schemes which met these criteria were selected (Table 2). Ethical approval for the research was 
obtained from the Senegalese Ministry of Health. 
CBHI schemes in Senegal (including those selected for the study) typically aimed to promote 
community participation through a model of democratic governance promoted by the International 
Labour Organization (ILO, 2000). A President, Treasurer, Secretary and Board of Directors are elected 
by scheme members. Schemes are expected to organise training sessions, annual general assemblies 
and regular meetings through which members of the scheme and the local community can 
participate in implementation and decision-making and hold scheme staff accountable.   
 
INSERT TABLE 2 AROUND HERE 
Sampling design 
Lists of members (households that were up-to-date with premium payments) and ex-members 
(households that had not paid the monthly premium – see details below) were obtained for each 
CBHI scheme and used as sampling frames. Each scheme was sampled separately and members and 
ex-members were sampled separately using disproportionate stratified random sampling (Table 3), 
in order to ensure the inclusion of sufficient numbers of current members in the study. The analysis 
was conducted on merged data from all three schemes.  
The household questionnaire was administered to the named member / ex-member (i.e. the 
“adhérent”) in each household.   
INSERT TABLE 3 AROUND HERE 
Questionnaire design 
A questionnaire was developed with six components: socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics; a household roster; economic characteristics; social capital; membership of CBHI; 
and health and utilisation of health services. The full list of variables included in the study is 
presented in Table 4.  
INSERT TABLE 4 AROUND HERE 
Model 
A logit model was used to analyse the probability of retaining CBHI membership (i.e. not dropping 
out). Several regressions were run. The first was a restricted model which contained a basic set of 
socioeconomic variables (equation 1). In each subsequent regression (equations 2 to 31), an extra 
independent variable or set of variables was analysed separately, in order to test various hypotheses 
regarding the determinants of CBHI drop-out (the hypotheses are explained below).  
A model of the following form was estimated: 
Logit [𝑝 (y = 1)] = log  (
𝑝
1−𝑝
) = α + β 1X1,i + …+ β6X6,i 
where Y is being a current member of CBHI or not,  X1-6 are dummies indicating whether the 
individual has or does not have a specific characteristic, p is the probability of retaining CBHI 
membership, α is the constant and βs are the model parameters. All models include all observations 
from all three schemes and were estimated using STATA 10.0. 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable was CBHI membership status (current member = 1, ex-member = 0). The 
design of the dependent variable was not straightforward.  Two sources of information were 
available for defining membership status. The first was information provided by the scheme 
administration which was used to create the sampling frame for the study. However, some of the 
households that had not paid the monthly premium may not have considered themselves to have 
dropped-out of the scheme and may have intended to pay the outstanding payments and a penalty 
charge (mandated by the schemes’ rules) in order to re-gain membership. The second source of 
information on membership status was self-reported (the respondent was asked whether they were 
a current member or an ex-member, the latter being defined as having decided to permanently drop 
out of the scheme); this information was collected in the questionnaire. The latter source (i.e. self-
reported status) is used in the analysis.  
Independent variables 
Variables in the restricted model 
The variables included in the restricted model are described in Table 4 (sections a and f). Scheme 
dummies were included to account for the fixed effect of which scheme the members/ex-members 
(had) belonged to. Demographic variables control for differences in age and gender. Socioeconomic 
variables control for the possibility that wealthier and more educated people are more likely to 
remain enrolled. An expenditure variable was based on reported monthly household expenditure on 
14 different categories and adjusted (providing a weight of 1 for the first adult, 0.7 for other adults 
and 0.5 for each child) (Forster, 1994; OECD). To proxy household wealth, an asset index was 
constructed by performing a principal component analysis using household possession of goods 
(Howe et al., 2009).  
Variables measuring active participation 
Five variables measure modes of active participation in CBHI (Table 4, section d). Four of these are 
formal modes, measuring participation in: raising awareness of / disseminating information on the 
scheme; a general assembly; electing leaders of the scheme; and training. The fifth variable 
measures informal active participation: having ever had informal discussions about and/or 
spontaneously helped the scheme. All five variables can be categorised as “activities” in Table1. 
Another set of variables measures the potential intermediary outcomes of active participation (Table 
4, section e): information flow, measured using two variables (being informed of mechanisms of 
controlling abuse/fraud by scheme staff/members/health providers; and source of information on 
the existence of the scheme); accountability (perceptions of influence over scheme operation; trust 
(perceptions of trustworthiness of scheme management / president); solidarity, measured using 
three variables (perception of shared values / solidarity; belief that solidarity is advantage of CBHI; 
and opinions about cross-subsidisation); perceptions of inclusiveness of the scheme measured by 
two variables (opinions about the diversity of members of the scheme; and perception of whether 
people are excluded from the scheme); interpersonal relationships within the scheme, measured 
using three variables (knowing the scheme President/Secretary/Manager/other staff; knowing other 
members of the scheme; and perception of having something in common with other scheme 
members).  
These variables test the aforementioned hypothesis that active participation in CBHI and its 
potential intermediary benefits, such as trust, information and solidarity are negatively correlated 
with drop-out. 
Other independent variables 
The remaining independent variables test competing hypotheses (table 4, sections a-c and f). Two 
variables measure religion and ethnicity respectively, to account for the possibility that drop-out was 
related to socio-cultural factors. The household size variable measures whether larger households 
may have dropped out due to the increased financial burden of premium payments. Variables 
focusing on satisfaction with premium price and source of premium payments also measure whether 
drop-out is related to financial barriers.  The health and health services variables account for the 
possibility that adverse selection, geographic access to health service providers, and reliance on 
traditional medicine explain drop-out from CBHI. The two social capital variables measure the 
structure of people’s social networks, in order to test the hypothesis that CBHI benefits from existing 
social capital (Mladovsky & Mossialos, 2008), discussed above. The first variable measures having 
privileged social relationships (with people who may or may not also be members of the CBHI 
scheme). In Senegal “privileged social relationships” such as being a godfather or godmother 
constitute emotional and affective ties but can also be a medium for reciprocal instrumental 
support. The second social capital variable measures membership of community associations other 
than CBHI. Having privileged relations and membership of other community associations are 
assumed to be antecedent to membership CBHI, since CBHI was established relatively recently in 
Senegal compared to these other social structures. The “satisfaction with scheme functioning” 
variable measures whether negative experiences of CBHI functioning (such as premium collection) 
affect drop-out.  
4. Results 
The total sample size is 382 households, corresponding to a response rate of 78%. The sample 
contains 227 members and 155 ex-members (60 households defined as ex-members by the 
scheme’s administration defined themselves as members in the questionnaire, while 14 households 
defined by the scheme administration as members defined themselves as ex-members).   
The results of the logistic regression are presented in Tables 5 to 7.  The results indicate that 
although members of the CBHI schemes were wealthier and had higher expenditure levels than ex-
members the difference was not statistically significant (equations 1-31). Satisfaction with the 
accessibility of premium price was quite low in the sample, at 38.68% (see supplementary material 
for descriptive statistics) [INSERT LINK TO SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL] but the odds ratio for this 
variable was not significant (equation 31). The odds ratios for the demographic, education 
(equations 1-31), ethnicity and religion (equations 2-3) variables were also not significant, except for 
age.   
INSERT TABLES 5 – 7 AROUND HERE 
The correlation between the health and health service variables and scheme membership was more 
pronounced (equations 4-9). Member households were twice as likely to have had an illness, 
accident or injury, and nearly twice as likely to have a disability, than ex-member households, 
pointing to adverse selection. They were more than twice as likely to be situated closer to a health 
service provider. They were three times more likely to report that health care access is an advantage 
of membership and had a much higher probability of reporting that the quality of health service 
providers was satisfactory. All these variables have significant odds ratios, with quality of care being 
the strongest in the study. Three quarters of members felt that the quality of care of all the 
providers contracted by the scheme was satisfactory, compared to half of ex-members.   
Rates of active participation ranged between 8% and 48% for ex-members and 20% and 65% for 
members.  Members were statistically significantly twice as likely or more to: have had informal 
discussions about and/or ever spontaneously helped the scheme; participated in raising awareness 
and/or information dissemination; voted in scheme elections; attended a general assembly; and 
received training (equations 12-16). The latter variable had the highest odds ratio.  
Source of information on existence of the scheme was significantly correlated with scheme status, 
with members being more likely than ex-members to have heard of the scheme from a family 
member or friend compared to another source (equation 17). 
All the odds ratios for the following variables measuring perceptions or knowledge of scheme 
management were greater than two and significant, with members being more likely than ex-
members to: be informed of mechanisms of controlling abuse and/or fraud by scheme staff, 
members and/or health providers (equation 18); think they could influence scheme operation 
(equation 19); be satisfied with the trustworthiness of scheme management and/or president 
(equation 20); know the scheme President, Secretary, Manager and/or another staff member 
(equation 26); and rate the operation of the scheme as excellent or satisfactory (equation 29). The 
biggest difference was in the trust variable; while nearly 70% of scheme members reported that the 
scheme managers or leaders were trustworthy, only around one third of ex-members did so 
(equation 20).  
Less than half of the sample reported that they share a vision on values and/or solidarity with other 
members of the scheme, and only one third believed that solidarity is advantage of CBHI 
membership. The odds ratios for these two variables were not statistically significant (equations 21 
and 22). Principal component 1 was statistically significant, with members being more likely to have 
more solidarity than ex-members (equation 23). The highest scores (0.45 - 0.40) in the PCA (principal 
component analysis) were for agreement with the following three statements (in order of their 
scores): members of the scheme should sponsor families who are very poor; members should 
support families who are very poor by increasing the amount of their contribution; and families who 
are very poor should be members of the scheme without paying. The next highest scores (0.35 - 
0.31) were for: the scheme should merge with other CBHI schemes in the region; families who do 
not have the means to contribute must be supported by the government; it is acceptable that the 
beneficiaries of the scheme who become ill benefit more from the services of the scheme. The 
lowest score (0.29) was for: it is acceptable for someone to pay the CBHI premium even though s/he 
has not yet benefited from the services offered by the scheme. Only around 10% of the sample 
reported believing that some people are excluded from the scheme; there was almost no difference 
between members and ex-members (equation 25). Members were nearly seven times more likely to 
know half or nearly all the other members of the scheme than ex-members (equation 27). 
Furthermore, they were less likely than ex-members to report having nothing in common with the 
other members of the scheme (equation 28).  
The results suggest that members may have higher levels of social capital than ex-members, as 
ceteris paribus their households were nearly eight times more likely to belong to six or more 
community associations other than CBHI than ex-members (equation 11).  
The scheme 2 dummy variable is significant in almost all of the regressions. However, this is an 
artefact of the sampling procedure (the proportion of ex-members sampled in scheme 2 is much 
higher than in the other two schemes) and does not reflect the real level of drop-out which is lower 
in scheme 2 than in scheme 1 (Table 2).  
 
5. Discussion 
All five variables measuring active community participation are negatively correlated with drop-out. 
Interestingly, the more active the mode of participation, the stronger was the correlation.  As 
discussed, researchers and policymakers have hypothesised that information, accountability, trust 
and solidarity would increase enrolment in CBHI. The results to some extent support this view as 
perceived trustworthiness of scheme management / president; accountability and being informed of 
mechanisms of controlling abuse/fraud are all correlated with remaining in the scheme. The result 
that members were more likely than non-members to hear about the CBHI scheme from a family 
member or friend also seems to support the hypothesis that high levels of trust promote population 
coverage, presuming that family and friends were the most trusted source of information. However 
solidarity does not, on the whole, seem to affect drop-out.  
These results suggest that schemes may be able to reduce drop-out by creating more opportunities 
for more active participation. Caution is needed, however, in attributing the direction of causality; it 
is possible that people never actively participated in the CBHI schemes because they had dropped 
out of the schemes rather than vice versa. The significance of the results for the possible 
intermediary outcomes of active participation such as trust, information and accountability suggest 
this is not the case. It would make little sense, for example, that a person did not trust the scheme 
leaders when they were a member of the scheme, because they had dropped out of the scheme. 
Arguably, the two variables which conceptually link all the active participation variables are knowing 
the scheme leaders/staff and knowing other scheme members. It is possible that through active 
participation, members of CBHI developed personal relationships with the scheme leaders, staff and 
with each other, thereby increasing their access to information and trust in the scheme and 
ultimately reducing the likelihood of dropping out. As such, it could be argued that active community 
participation in CBHI may increase levels of social capital of CBHI members and that this may in-turn 
reduce the likelihood of drop-out.  
Quality of health services was identified as the most important determinant of drop-out, as in 
previous studies (Criel & Waelkens, 2003; Dong et al., 2009). It is possible that the participatory 
dynamic in CBHI empowered members to successfully demand good quality care, as proposed in 
other literature on CBHI  (Criel et al., 2005; Michielsen et al., 2011; Schneider, 2005; Waelkens & 
Criel, 2007).  
Overall, the results suggest that active community participation does take place in CBHI and that it 
may reduce drop out. This may be because active participation increases (a) trust, information and 
accountability, through increased social capital and (b) quality of care through increased 
empowerment. However, more research is needed to explore these causal pathways. While this is 
ostensibly good news for proponents of active community participation in CBHI it also raises 
concerns. The majority of people who dropped out of CBHI did not take up opportunities to actively 
participate, did not trust the scheme staff or leaders, felt they were not able to hold the CBHI 
scheme to account, did not know many other members and did not believe that CBHI promotes 
solidarity. Given the high drop-out rates from CBHI (Table 3), this suggests that active participation 
only benefited a small minority of people who enrolled in CBHI.  
It is not clear why ex-members of CBHI did not actively participate in CBHI when they were 
members; further research would be needed to understand this. One possible explanation comes 
from the community participation literature which argues that participatory development may 
obscure local power differences by uncritically celebrating “the community” (Williams, 2004). It is 
argued that projects promoting community participation are often initiated by international 
development agencies which fail to take into account local power relationships and instead accept 
inequalities as social norms. Because of this, if uncritically applied, participatory community 
programmes can inadvertently exacerbate disadvantage (Kothari, 2001). This critique may be 
relevant to CBHI which has typically been introduced with the support of international development 
agencies (Criel & Van Dormael, 1999). It is possible that CBHI has been uncritically introduced in the 
Senegalese context in a manner which inadvertently prevents some less empowered social groups 
from actively participating. While there do not seem to be inequalities in wealth between members 
and ex-members, the results on social capital (measured by membership of other community 
associations) suggest that there may be other social inequalities at play. A possible explanation may 
be that if CBHI schemes have very limited funds to support active community participation, only 
some members of CBHI are likely to be successful in accessing these resources. These individuals are 
likely to be those who already have higher levels of social capital or who are already more 
empowered. This interpretation is supported by Bourdieu’s theory (Bourdieu, 1986) that people who 
already hold forms of capital (economic, social, cultural and/or symbolic) are strategically adept at 
accumulating and transforming it (he argued that these types of capital are fungible). It also echoes 
the findings of an extensive literature review of studies on participatory development and 
decentralization which finds that participants in civic activities tend to be wealthier, more educated, 
of higher social status (by caste and ethnicity), male, and more politically connected than 
nonparticipants. The authors suggest the reason for this may be that resource allocation processes 
of organisations inducing participation typically reﬂect the preferences of elite groups (Mansuri & 
Rao, 2013).  
 
6. Limitations  
The study has important limitations. Firstly, as it is an exploratory study, it covers a small number of 
schemes and the sample size is small. The study would merit from being repeated on a larger scale. 
Furthermore, the study is limited to schemes with high levels of drop-out. Further comparative 
research analysing schemes with low levels of drop-out would be useful for drawing lessons at the 
scheme level. Another limitation is that due to the cross-sectional and non-experimental study 
design, it is difficult to attribute causality. It is also difficult to attribute the direction of causality, as 
already discussed. These issues could be addressed with further qualitative research investigating 
members’ and ex-members’ views of participation and drop-out. Qualitative research could also 
have been useful for informing the content of the questionnaire. Indeed, because intended 
beneficiaries were not involved in developing the questionnaire, it is possible there is a researchers' 
bias. Finally, because of the sampling procedure, it is not possible to determine the rate of active 
participation in the schemes.  
 
7. Conclusions 
This study contributes to the literature on CBHI by providing a conceptual framework of passive and 
active community participation which is relevant to understanding drop out from CBHI. The results 
suggest that there may be many potential benefits of active community participation in CBHI. These 
include increased trust, information flow and accountability, increased population coverage due to 
fewer households dropping out of CBHI, increased social capital of CBHI members and increased 
empowerment of CBHI patients when accessing health care. However, it is also possible that people 
with already high levels of social capital benefit more from the participatory dynamic, meaning that 
CBHI inadvertently exacerbates inequalities in communities and in health coverage. One possible 
way of addressing this would be to target participatory activities to members with less social capital, 
although this is likely to be a challenging task as it implies overturning established social inequalities 
and hierarchies.  This in turn suggests that alternative or complementary financing policies are 
needed to target vulnerable groups.   
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Table 1. Mode, definition and examples of community participation in CBHI in Sub-Saharan Africa 
Mode of participation (in 
ascending order ranging from 
passive to active) 
Definition Examples of active community 
participation in CBHI in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
1. Benefits Passive: community members 
are recipients of services 
Enrolment / paying the 
premium 
2. Activities Active: community members 
contribute to health programmes 
but do not participate in the 
choice of what activities are to 
be undertaken or how they will 
be carried out 
Disseminating information, 
attending meetings and general 
assemblies, voting in elections, 
receiving training 
3. Management Active: those involved in 
activities have some managerial 
responsibilities. They make 
decisions about how these 
activities are to be run, but do 
not decide which activities are 
undertaken  
Managing the day-to-day 
operation of the scheme (e.g. 
enrolling members, collecting 
premiums, managing finances, 
holding meetings and general 
assemblies) 
4. Monitoring and 
evaluating 
Active: community members 
are involved in measuring 
objectives and in monitoring 




reporting and reviewing  
5. Planning Active: community members 
(usually key individuals such as 
leaders and teachers) decide 
what programmes they 
wish to undertake and ask health 
staff, agencies and/or 
government to provide the 
expertise and/or resources to 
enable the activities to be 
pursued 
Identifying the need for the 
scheme; deciding on the 
scheme design and objectives 
(e.g. benefits package, 
premium price, mode of 
collection, target population); 
leading the scheme (e.g. 
contracting providers, hiring 
and training staff, setting the 
agenda for general assemblies, 
attracting funding, research 
and technical assistance); 
coordinating CBHI on a regional 
level; developing CBHI policy. 
Source: Adapted from (Rifkin 1986) and literature on community participation in CBHI in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
 
Table 2. Characteristics of the CBHI schemes included in the study 
Name of 
scheme 
Year of scheme 
commencement 












1997 Health post 












2001 Health post 

























Table 3. Household survey sample design 















(% of total ex-
members) 




1. Soppante 985 (166 + 819) 83% 70 (42%) 91 (11%) 161 
2. Ndondol 463 (136 + 327) 71% 58 (42%) 98 (30%) 156 
3. Wer ak 
Werle 
(WAW) 
678 (281 + 397) 58% 85 (30%) 85 (21%) 170 
Totals 2,126 (583 + 
1,543) 
72% 213 (36%) 274 (17%) 487 
 
  
Table 4. Variables included in the study  
Variable Description 
Dependent variable  
Member 1 = current member of the scheme. 0 = ex-member (i.e. dropped out) 
Independent variables  
a. Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics 
Age quintiles  1 = age quintile, otherwise 0. Age1 is the lowest quintile (baseline) 
Gender   
Male 1 = male, 0 = female 
Education    
None  1 = no education, otherwise 0 (baseline) 
Literate 1 = highest educational attainment is literacy, otherwise 0 
Primary 1 = highest educational attainment is primary education, otherwise 0 
Secondary or 
higher 





1 = expenditure quintile, otherwise 0. Ex q1 is the lowest quintile (baseline)  
Household asset 
quintile (%) 
1 = asset quintile, otherwise 0. Ass q1 is the lowest quintile (baseline) 
Ethnicity and religion   
Wolof 1 = wolof, otherwise 0 
Muslim 1 = muslim, otherwise 0 
HH size tertile 1 = HH size tertile, otherwise 0. HH size1 is the lowest tertile (baseline)  
b. Health and health service access 
Health of HH   
Disability 1 = one or more members of the household has a disability, otherwise 0 
Chronic illness  1 = one or more members of the household has a chronic illness, otherwise 0 
Recent illness  
1 = one or more members of the household had an illness, accident or injury in 
the last 15 days, otherwise 0 
Health care access is advantage of scheme membership 
Advantage 
1 = when asked "what are / were the advantages of scheme membership for 
your household?" selected "health care access", otherwise 0 
Quality of health service providers contracted by the scheme 
No providers 
satisfactory 
1 =  when asked "are / were you satisifed with the quality of the health service 




1 = "yes" for some but not all providers, otherwise 0 
All providers 
satisfactory 
1 = "yes" for all providers, otherwise 0 
Household use of traditional medicine 
Traditional 1 = at least one member of the household used traditional medicine in the last 
medicine month, otherwise 0 
Nearest health care provider   
<= 2km  
1 = nearest health care provider is located 2km or less from the household, 
otherwise 0 
c. Social capital  
Privileged social relationships 
Yes 
1 = has a “privileged social relationship” with at least one other person, 
otherwise 0 
Household membership of community associations other than the CBHI scheme 
0 associations 
1 = nobody in the household is a member of a community association, 
otherwise 0 (baseline) 
1-5 associations 1 = household is member of 1 to 5 community associations, otherwise 0 
>6 associations 1 = household is member of more than 6 community associations, otherwise 0 
d. Active participation in the scheme 
Informal 
participation 
1 = has ever participated in informal discussions about / spontaneously helped 




1 = has ever participated in raising awareness  /disseminating information about 
the scheme, otherwise 0 
General assembly 1 = has ever participated in the scheme's general assembly, otherwise 0 
Voting 1 = has ever elected a leader of the scheme, otherwise 0 
Training 1 = has ever received training under the scheme, otherwise 0 
e. Intermediary outcomes of active participation 
Source of information on existence of the scheme 
Friend or family 
1 = learnt of CBHI scheme from a friend or family member, 0 = learnt of CBHI 
scheme from a health service provider, CBHI staff, CBHI members, a community 
association, community leader, media, or other source 
Mechanisms of controlling abuse/fraud by scheme staff/members/health  providers 
Informed 
1 = when asked "do/did you know of mechanisms of controlling abuse/fraud by 
people in the scheme?" selected "yes" for at least one of the following 
categories: staff; other members; health providers. 0 = selected "no" for all 
categories 
Believes can influence scheme operation  
Influence 
1 = when asked "do/did you think you are able to influence the functioning of 
the scheme?" selected "yes". 0 = "no" 
Trustworthiness of scheme staff / leaders 
Satisfied 
1 = when asked "what aspects of the scheme are/were satisfactory?" selected 
"scheme leader is/was trustworthy" and/or "scheme staff are/were 
trustworthy", otherwise 0 




1 = when asked "what do you think you have in common with the other 
members of the scheme?" selected "same vision on values / solidarity". 0 = 
neighbours, village, family, relatives, religion, gender, age group, ethnicity, 
language, caste, level of education, occupation, political affiliation, economic 
status, nothing, members of another association, or other 
Solidarity is advantage of scheme membership 
Advantage 
1 = when asked "what are / were the advantages of scheme membership for 
your household?" selected "solidarity", otherwise 0 
Types of cross-subsidisation that should occur in the scheme 
Principle 
component 1 
Respondents were asked whether they agreed with 7 statements about 
solidarity in the scheme, providing answers on a likert scale, with 1 representing 
"strongly disagree" (lowest level of solidarity) and 5 representing "strongly 




Scheme should accept diverse members 
Principle 
component 3 
Respondents were presented with the statement "should the scheme accept 
people from diverse..." and were asked about the following categories: 
neighbourhood or village, family or relatives, religion, gender, age group, 
ethnicity or language, caste, education, profession, political affiliation, economic 
status. They provided answers on a likert scale, with 1 representing "strongly 
disagree" (lowest level of solidarity) and 5 representing "strongly agree" 
(highest level of solidarity) 
Some people excluded from the scheme 
Yes 
1 = when asked "do you think some members of the community are excluded 
from the scheme" replied "yes". 0 = "no" 
Scheme President/Secretary/Manager/other staff 
Knows   
1 = when asked "do/did you know the people who work in the scheme" selected 
"yes" for at least one of the following categories: President; Secretary; Manager; 
other staff. 0 = selected "no" for all categories 
Knows other members of the scheme 
None  1 = knows no other members of the scheme, otherwise 0 (baseline) 
Few 1 = knows few other members of the scheme, otherwise 0  
Half or nearly all 1 = knows half or nearly all the other members of the scheme, otherwise 0  
Has characteristics in common with other scheme members 
None  
1 = when asked "what do you think you have in common with the other 
members of the scheme?" selected "nothing". 0 = neighbours, village, family, 
relatives, religion, gender, age group, ethnicity, language, caste, level of 
education, occupation, political affiliation, economic status, same vision on 
values / solidarity, members of another association, or other 
f. Other CBHI variables 
Scheme of which household is / was a member 
Scheme1 1 = scheme 1 (Soppante), otherwise 0 (baseline) 
Scheme2 1 = scheme 2 (Ndondol), otherwise 0 
Scheme3 1 = scheme 3 (WAW), otherwise 0 
Scheme operation  
Excellent or 
satisfactory 
1 = when asked "how well do / did you feel the CBHI scheme functions?" 
selected "excellently or satisfactorily". 0 = replied "average, badly or very badly" 
Source of money for paying the premium 
Salary 
1 = source of money for paying the premium is salary or regular income 
generated by the household. 0 = sale of harvest, savings, one-off sale of goods, 
remittances, other 
Premium price accessibility  
Satisfied 
1 = when asked "what aspects of the scheme are/were satisfactory?" selected 
"premium price is accessible", otherwise 0 
 Note: all variables are individual level unless the household level is specified  
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Table 5. Odds ratios for retaining insurance, part 1  
Equation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Scheme  
         Scheme2: Ndondol 0.42*** 0.53* 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.47** 0.39*** 1.16 0.42** 0.41*** 
Scheme3: WAW 0.68 0.69 0.67 0.65 0.68 0.62 0.99 0.66 0.56 
Demographic characteristics 
        Age2 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.64 0.67 0.44* 0.66 0.67 
Age3 0.96 0.98 0.95 0.97 0.98 0.98 1.03 0.96 1.01 
Age4 0.51* 0.56 0.53* 0.53* 0.51* 0.54 0.26*** 0.52* 0.56 
Age5 (highest) 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.38* 0.31*** 0.34*** 
Male 0.81 0.79 0.78 0.82 0.76 0.86 1.48 0.78 0.8 
Education 
         Literate 0.88 0.87 0.93 0.86 0.72 0.78 1.09 0.86 0.9 
Primary 1.12 1.16 1.07 1.1 1.1 1.06 1 1.11 1.02 
Secondary or higher 0.94 1.02 0.92 0.89 0.95 0.88 0.64 0.93 0.91 
Household expenditure quintile 
        Ex q2 0.93 0.91 0.98 0.9 1.11 0.91 1.24 0.99 1.09 
Ex q3 0.68 0.63 0.67 0.67 0.73 0.67 0.65 0.68 0.8 
Ex q4 0.59 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.71 0.6 0.63 0.6 0.75 
Ex q5 (highest) 1.34 1.29 1.31 1.19 1.75 1.24 2.77* 1.38 1.64 
Household asset quintile 
         Ass q2 0.93 0.95 0.93 0.93 0.88 0.86 1.01 0.95 1 
Ass q3 1.1 1.12 1.11 1.09 0.98 0.92 0.9 1.09 1.09 
Ass q4 1.49 1.49 1.52 1.51 1.45 1.3 1.28 1.5 1.34 
Ass q5 (highest) 1.62 1.74 1.69 1.72 1.39 1.49 2.55* 1.62 1.35 
Ethnicity and religion  
         Wolof 
 
1.57 
       Muslim 
  
0.82 
      HH size tertile 
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HH size2  
   
0.93 
     HH size3 (highest) 
   
0.79 
     Health of HH 
         Disability 
 
      
  
1.74* 
    Chronic illness  
    
1.01 
    Recent illness  
 
      
  
2.00** 
    Health care access is advantage 
of scheme membership       
       Advantage 
     
3.05*** 
   Quality of health service providers  
contracted by the scheme       
       Some providers satisfactory 
     
5.54*** 
  All providers satisfactory 
      
13.92*** 
  Household use of traditional medicine in last month 
      Traditional medicine 
       
1.21 
 Nearest health care provider  
        <= 2km  
        
2.25** 
Notes: *P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01. 






Table 6. Odds ratios for retaining insurance, part 2 
 
Equation 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
Scheme            
Scheme2: Ndondol 0.26*** 0.41*** 0.38** 0.23*** 0.42** 0.42** 0.45** 0.44** 0.41*** 0.40** 0.53 
Scheme3: WAW 0.57 0.68 0.48* 0.41** 0.59 0.64 0.69 0.73 0.67 0.6 0.52 
Demographic characteristics 
       Age2 0.82 0.76 0.51* 0.51 0.72 0.69 0.66 0.68 0.71 0.66 0.87 
Age3 1.1 0.98 1.04 1.08 0.9 0.87 0.88 0.95 1 1.09 1.08 
Age4 0.41** 0.50* 0.48* 0.39** 0.48* 0.42** 0.45** 0.50* 0.51* 0.48* 0.83 
Age5 (highest) 0.28*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.25*** 0.31*** 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.33*** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.42* 
Male 0.82 0.82 0.82 0.8 0.74 0.74 0.84 0.8 0.8 0.67 0.64 
Education 
           Literate 0.8 0.83 0.7 0.55 0.76 0.84 0.82 0.91 0.81 0.78 1.05 
Primary 0.77 1.18 1.43 1.17 1.15 1.12 1.09 1.19 1.09 1.16 0.87 
Secondary or higher 1.04 0.83 0.75 0.78 0.71 0.72 0.73 0.92 0.77 0.65 0.81 
Household expenditure quintile 
       Ex q2 1.03 1 0.91 0.79 1.11 1.02 1.04 0.91 0.95 0.86 1.33 
Ex q3 0.57 0.66 0.72 0.58 0.79 0.74 0.78 0.7 0.76 0.6 0.97 
Ex q4 0.41* 0.64 0.69 0.58 0.76 0.61 0.61 0.58 0.62 0.55 1.06 
Ex q5 (highest) 1.13 1.38 1.41 1.06 1.90 1.47 1.51 1.37 1.35 1.26 1.96 
Household asset quintile 
         Ass q2 0.94 1.02 1.26 1.41 1.04 0.99 0.95 0.97 0.86 0.98 1.11 
Ass q3 1.24 1.03 1.11 0.83 1 1.03 1.15 1.15 0.96 1.13 1.01 
Ass q4 2 1.33 1.37 1.2 1.29 1.32 1.34 1.51 1.31 1.43 1.49 
Ass q5 (highest) 1.5 1.52 1.46 1.47 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.69 1.6 1.66 1.48 
Privileged social relationships 
         Yes 1.9 
          Household membership of community associations 






         >6 associations 
 
7.84*** 
         Active participation in the scheme 
       Informal discussions/spontaneously helped 
(frequently/sometimes/rarely) 2.04**         
Raising awareness / information   2.08**        
General assembly     2.45***       
Voting 
     
2.96*** 
     Training 
      
3.00*** 
    Source of information on existence of the scheme 
     Friend or family 




   Mechanisms of controlling abuse/fraud by scheme staff/members/health  providers 
 Informed 
        
2.04** 
  Believe can influence scheme operation 
      Influence 
         
2.32*** 
 Trustworthiness of scheme staff / leaders          
Satisfied           4.01*** 
 
Notes: *P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01. 




Table 7. Odds ratios for retaining insurance, part 3 
 
Equation 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
Scheme  
           Scheme2: Ndondol 0.48** 0.40*** 0.41*** 0.39*** 0.41*** 0.45** 0.35*** 0.50** 0.48** 0.41*** 0.46* 
Scheme3: WAW 0.65 0.7 0.65 0.57 0.67 0.58 0.50* 0.68 0.51* 0.6 0.6 
Demographic charactersitcs 
           Age2 0.69 0.69 0.64 0.66 0.72 0.76 0.65 0.71 0.59 0.73 0.87 
Age3 1.01 0.99 0.9 1.01 0.98 1.18 0.92 1.05 0.95 1.05 1.07 
Age4 0.50* 0.53* 0.48* 0.54* 0.53* 0.54 0.51* 0.51* 0.55 0.53* 0.69 
Age5 (highest) 0.37** 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.36*** 0.30*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.37** 0.35** 0.38** 0.44* 
Male 0.75 0.81 0.81 0.8 0.78 0.71 0.64 0.77 0.71 0.78 0.68 
Education 
           Literate 0.75 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.95 0.71 0.73 0.76 0.87 0.83 0.98 
Primary 1.39 1.12 1.06 1.19 1.12 1.23 1.02 1.36 1.05 1.26 0.87 
Secondary or higher 0.88 0.92 0.88 0.9 0.95 0.76 0.57 0.85 0.97 0.86 0.98 
Household expenditure quintile 
          Ex q2 1.01 0.89 0.9 0.97 1.01 1.03 0.89 1 1.22 0.86 1.23 
Ex q3 0.67 0.63 0.64 0.66 0.71 0.8 0.66 0.64 0.82 0.65 0.76 
Ex q4 0.54 0.55 0.56 0.6 0.61 0.86 0.69 0.53 0.89 0.57 0.79 
Ex q5 (highest) 1.47 1.22 1.27 1.47 1.37 1.72 1.51 1.43 2 1.34 1.54 
Household asset quintile 
           Ass q2 0.99 0.91 0.94 0.87 0.88 1 0.94 0.94 1.16 0.97 1.35 
Ass q3 0.93 1.1 1.06 1.1 1.06 0.99 1 0.97 1.14 1.1 1.19 
Ass q4 1.29 1.49 1.48 1.43 1.33 1.3 1.21 1.3 1.82 1.64 1.47 
Ass q5 (highest) 1.48 1.62 1.58 1.65 1.5 1.58 1.66 1.55 1.87 1.88 1.67 
Vision on values / solidarity  
          Shared vision with other 
members 1.05 
          
35 
 
Solidarity is advantage of scheme membership 
         Advantage 
 
1.4 
         Types of cross-subsidisation that should occur in the scheme 
       Principle component 1 
  
1.12* 
        Principle component 2 
  
1.1 
        Scheme should accept diverse members 
         Principle component 3 
   
1.06 
       Some people excluded from the scheme 
         Yes 
    
1.03 
      Scheme President/Secretary/Manager/other staff 
        Knows   
     
3.53*** 
     Knows other members of the scheme 
          Few 
      
2.05 
    Half or nearly all 
      
7.68*** 
    Has characteristics in common with other scheme members 
       None  
       
0.38* 
   Scheme operation 
           Excellent or satisfactory 
        
2.80*** 
  Source of money for paying the premium 
         Salary / revenue 
         
1.27 
 Premium price accessibility 
           Satisfied 
          
1.4 
 
Notes: *P<0.10; **P<0.05; ***P<0.01. 















a. Demographic and socioeconomic characteristics 
  Age quintile  
   Age1 (lowest) 27.52 17.53 23.39 
Age2 23.39 18.83 21.51 
Age3 22.94 18.18 20.97 
Age4 14.68 20.78 17.20 
Age5 (highest) 11.47 24.68 16.94 
Gender 
   Male 39.64 50.00 43.88 
Education (%) 
   None  49.78 58.44 53.32 
Literate 17.94 16.88 17.51 
Primary 17.94 13.64 16.18 
Secondary or higher 14.35 11.04 13.00 
Household expenditure quintile (%) 
   Ex q1 (lowest) 17.70 22.58 19.69 
Ex q2 15.49 14.84 15.22 
Ex q3 18.14 22.58 19.95 
Ex q4 20.80 25.16 22.57 
Ex q5 (highest) 27.88 14.84 22.57 
Household asset quintile (%) 
   Ass q1 (lowest) 16.51 18.12 17.17 
Ass q2 15.60 22.15 18.26 
37 
 
Ass q3 20.64 26.85 23.16 
Ass q4 19.27 15.44 17.71 
Ass q5 (highest) 27.98 17.45 23.71 
Ethnicity and religion  
   Wolof 55.95 38.96 49.08 
Muslim 92.95 92.21 92.65 
HH size tertile 
   HH size1 (lowest) 34.96 28.39 32.28 
HH size2  29.65 31.61 30.45 
HH size3 (highest) 35.40 40.00 37.27 
b. Health and health service access 
   Ill health of HH 
   Disability 18.50 16.13 17.54 
Chronic illness  45.37 40.91 43.57 
Recent illness  39.21 24.52 33.25 
Health care access is advantage of scheme membership 
  Advantage 93.83 84.52 90.05 
Quality of health service providers contracted by the scheme 
  No providers satisfactory 4.52 21.59 9.76 
Some providers satisfactory 19.10 27.27 21.60 
All providers satisfactory 76.38 51.14 68.64 
Household use of traditional medicine in last month 
  Traditional medicine 54.63 51.30 53.28 
Nearest health care provider  
   <= 2km  86.30 71.43 80.16 
c. Social capital  
   Privileged social relations 
   Yes 95.31 90.91 93.52 
Household membership of community associations 
  0 associations 3.52 9.09 5.77 
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1-5 associations 83.26 86.36 84.51 
>6 associations 13.33 4.55 9.71 
d. Active participation in the scheme 
   Informal discussions/spontaneously helped 
(frequently/sometimes/rarely)  64.12 47.50 57.24 
Raising awareness / information 61.88 46.61 55.40 
General assembly 48.85 32.24 42.00 
Voting 26.76 14.00 21.49 
Training 20.28 8.05 15.24 
e. Intermediary outcomes of active participation 
  Source of information on existence of the scheme 
  Friend or family 22.83 13.07 18.82 
Mechanisms of controlling abuse/fraud by scheme staff/members/health  providers 
Informed 30.67 21.29 26.84 
Believe can influence scheme operation 
   Influence 46.85 28.77 39.67 
Trustworthiness of scheme staff / leaders 
   Satisfied 68.21 36.96 58.19 
Vision on values / solidarity  
   Shared vision with other members 43.44 43.18 43.34 
Solidarity is advantage of scheme membership 
  Advantage 35.68 31.61 34.03 
Types of cross-subsidisation that should occur in the scheme 
  Principle component 1 0.29 -0.18 0.00 
Principle component 2 0.08 0.01 0.00 
Scheme should accept diverse members 
   Principle component 3 0.17 0.04 0.00 
Some people excluded from the scheme 
   Yes 9.82 11.04 10.32 




Knows   82.06 59.87 73.07 
Knows other members of the scheme 
   None  5.29 14.84 9.16 
Few 54.63 67.10 59.69 
Half or nearly all 40.09 18.06 31.15 
Has characteristics in common with other scheme members 
  None  3.62 7.58 5.10 
f. Other CBHI variables 
   Scheme  
   Scheme1: Soppante 40.53 29.68 36.13 
Scheme2: Ndondol 23.79 41.29 30.89 
Scheme3: WAW 35.68 29.03 32.98 
Scheme operation 
   Excellent or satisfactory 79.82 60.14 72.13 
Source of money for paying the premium 
   Salary / revenue 78.32 65.97 73.51 
Premium price accessibility 
   Satisfied 40.51 34.78 38.68 
Totals 227 155 382 
 
Notes: *all results are reported as percentages except principle components 1, 2 and 3 
 
